370 
I P35 

4 
•y 2 



AR INFORMATION SERIES 



INo. 4 



August, 1917 



THE GREAT WAR 

From SPECTATOR to PARTICIPANT 



ANDREW c. Mclaughlin 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 




Published by COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, Washington, D. C. 



^J, .^ 



THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 

(Established by order of the President April 4, 1917.) 

Distributed free except that in the case of No. 2 and No. 3 of the 

Red, White, and Blue Series, the subscriber should forward 15 

cents each to cover the cost of printing. 

I. Red, White, and Blue Series: 

No. 1. How the War Came to America (English, German, 
Polish, Bohemian, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish). 

No. 2. National Service Handbook (primarily for libraries, 
- schools, Y. M. C. A.'s, clubs, fraternal organiza- 
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No. 3. The Battle Line of Democracy. Prose and Poetry of 
the Great War. 

No. 4. The President's Flag Day Speech with Evidence of Ger- 
many's Plans. 

No. 5. Conquest and Kultur, the Germans' Aims in Their Own 
Words, by Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll. 
Other issues in preparation. 

II. War Information Series: 

No. 1. The War Message and Facts Behind It. 

No. 2. The Nation in Arms, by Secretaries Lane and Baker. 

No. 3. The Government of Germany, by Prof. Charles D. 

Hazen. 
No. 4. The Great War: from Spectator to Participant. 
No. 5. A War of Self -Defense, by Secretary Lansing and 

Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post. 
No. 6, American Loyalty by Citizens of German Descent. 
No. 7. Amerikanische Biirgertreue, a translation of No. 6. 
No. 8. American Interest in Popular Government Abroad, by 

Prof. E. B. Greene. 
No. 9. Home Eeading Course for Citizen Soldiers. 
No. 10. First Session of the War Congress, by Charles Merz. 
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THE GREAT WAR: FROM SPECTATOR 
TO PARTICIPANT.' 



By Andrew C. McLaughlin, Professor of History, Univer- 
sity of Chicago. 

WHEN the war broke out in 1914 everyone in America 
was astonished and ahnost everyone was quite 
unable to understand the fundamental causes of 
it. Many of us were more than astonished; we were thor- 
oughly out of patience and without immediate and deep 
sympathies for either side in the struggle. America had 
lived in isolation. Though our Government had been 
to some extent drawn into the swirl of world politics, we 
had no deep-laid scheme for exploitation of inferior races, 
no colonial ambitions, no determination to force our prod- 
ucts on other nations and no fear of neighboring govern- 
ments. We did not know that we were being jealously 
watched and that spies recorded our temper and our frailties. 
We did not see that we had anj^thing to do with a European 
war. Of the ever-vexed Balkans we knew little or nothing, 
though we had heard of the "sick man of Europe," who 
seemed to be an unconscionable time in shuffling off this 
mortal coil. We had read of Hague conferences and peace 
societies and peace palaces, and believed that war was too 
absurd to be really possible between the nations of western 
Europe. 

With the invasion of Belgium we began to rub our eyes. 
We found that a region which had been known as the 
"cockpit" of Europe was once more to be beaten dowTi by 
the tramp of alien armies. And then came the stories of 
atrocities in Belgium. At first we read with doubt, and 
only after the publication of the "Bryce Report" with the 
supporting documents did we see the realities and believe 
the unbelievable. We discovered what militarism meant in 
its final qualities, militarism which included devastation and 

^ Revised and reprinted from the History Teacher's Magazine, June, 1917. 
3S79°— 17 S 



4 THE GREAT WAR. 

terrorism as portions of military policy. Belgium settled 
our sympathies, for we saw that the whole thing was pre- 
meditated; we realized that methods of mobilization, not to 
speak of strategic railroads, are not mapped out in a moment. 
International bullying, Machtpolitik, was shattered when it 
shocked the conscience of the world. John Bright, I believe 
it was, said that the only value of war is to teach geog- 
raphy; but this war has taught language; everybody knows 
what Schreckliehkeit means, and everybody knows too that 
it is involved in the philosophy of war when it is carried 
out with relentless thoroughness and with absolute disre- 
gard of the ordinary promptings of humanity. 

The attempts of German propagandists to justify the 
invasion showed an astonishing inability or unwillingness 
to make frank use of public documentary material. Docu- 
ments found in the Belgium archives showed that some years 
ago an English military officer and a Belgium official had 
consulted together as to what steps England should take 
in case Germany invaded Belgium. After Germany had 
done the very thing which England and Belgium had feared, 
German propagandists tried to justify her by declaring that 
Belgium was considering means of preventing it. The use 
made of the documents actually affronted our intelligence 
and added to our distrust. 

At that time we began to study deliberately the problem 
as to which nation was responsible for the war. It is now 
unnecessary to enter into the details of this question. None 
of the nations of Europe had been free, the world had not 
been free, from a species of intrusive, aggressive nationalism 
and from jealous rivalry in trade which made the mainte- 
nance of peace exceedingly difficult; colonial ambitions and 
dollar diplomacy had long daily threatened the peace of the 
world. This we knew ; but even if no one nation was solely 
responsible for a condition which made the maintenance of 
peace difficult, we were compelled to conclude that the out- 
break of hostilities was primarily chargeable to Germany; 
and, as we realized this, we became certain that America 
would hope for the defeat of the German armies. As we 
studied the situation it became plain that war was due either 
to a national panic or to premeditated determination to 



THE GRELVT WAR. 5 

gain territory and power by immediate action. The whole 
mind of Germany was prepared for it; Avar and armies, en- 
gines of destruction, the jealous enmity ascribed to for- 
eign nations, the loudly proclaimed perils of the Father- 
land — those things kept constantly in men's minds for 
years — laid the train for the conflagration. That the 
Teutonic powers deliberately planned a war in 1914 is 
indicated by considerable evidence. Though to-day some 
may think this evidence not entirely final and conclusive, 
it doubtless had its effect on everybody acquainted Avith the 
history of the last decade. This at least appeared certain : 
The military authorities in Germany, directly and Avith 
amazing forethought, planned for a war which must come 
soon, and they were determined to win for the country a 
"place in the sun" and establish its power. If authorities 
are convinced that a Avar is inevitable and approve what they 
confidently belicA^e will be its outcome, are they not likely to 
grasp the favorable moment for beginning hostilities? 

It is sometimes said that Germany intended to dominate 
the Avorld. We had great difficulty in belicAang in the ex- 
istence of such fantastic ambitions, but we came slowly to 
see (1) that Germany believed in the superiority of German 
efficiency and of German culture, and thought they must be 
made triumphant; (2) that at least the ruling classes had 
a curious incapacity to understand that political control was 
not necessary to the extension of influence, to permeation of 
thought, and* CA^en to the development of trade; (3) that 
these persons were determined that the world should live 
in awe of Germany, and if rivals threatened to prosper they 
must be beaten into becoming humility.^ Although all this 
is probably below the truth it is so preposterous that we still 
have moments of doubt ; and yet a person Avho has had un- 
usual opportunities for knowing the situation, and has but 
recently returned, after some years of residence in Germany, 
tells us, "The Battle of the Marne not only saved the allies — 
it saved German.y." That is the opinion even of a large 
part of the people of Germany. In the defeat at the ]\Iarne 



^ If anyone disbelieves the understatement above, he ought to read "Hurrah 
and Hallelujah," a book largely made up of documents collected by a Dane, 
Prof. J. P. Bang, of Copenhagen. 



b THE GREAT WAR. 

the hope of a world dominion wa"? shattered. The lunacy 
of the war lords then in control was changed. 

Still, as we began to realize all these things, we did not 
yet feel that it was our business to enter the conflict, not 
even when we came to see that America herself was in actual 
danger, certainly in actual and immediate danger if Germany 
was not defeated by the allies. We were loath to credit 
what appears to be the truth, that, to attribute to the Kaiser 
the offensive words of Napoleon — America was within the 
scope of his policy. Possibly it was shameful in us to wait 
and to rely on the allied powers when we began to feel that 
this defeat imperiled our own safety. But something more 
than fear was needed to force us into the fight; not until the 
issues were clear to the nations of the world, not until there 
was hope for a constructive peace, not till we heard the call 
of humanity were we prepared to fling in our power and 
resources. 

Doubtless our final entrance into the conflict was brought 
about by cumulative irritation at German methods and 
policies. Our conviction of their unworthiness grew gradu- 
ally day by day. This conviction was the result of experi- 
ence of having actually lived through a great crisis. Among 
these irritations, Mdiich opened our eyes and hardened our 
hearts, none was more powerful than the machinations of 
the German spies. We were more than irritated, wo Avere 
enlightened; we discovered what Weltpolitik and Bealpolitik 
really were; German espionage in this country helped us to 
grasp the nature of a principle which is essentially criminal 
and which, if it continues, must make decent international 
relationships quite impossible. And so this fact began to 
stand out strongly: Democracy can not survive in an atmos- 
phere of indecent intrigue; the Government at Washington 
was forced to conclude that we can not act in friendliness or 
cooperate with a government whose ways are devious, 
ungenerous, purely selfish, and unreliable. 

It is perhaps unnecessary to speak of Zeppelin raids, 
poisonous gases, and deportation of men and women from 
the occupied portions of France and Belgium, although we 
have no right to forget these facts ; they are natural products, 
once more, of militaristic doctrine. We must remember 



THE GREAT WAR. 7 

that, if war means these horrors, all our efforts may well be 
directed against the prolongation of war and the success of 
militarism. Civilization is actually at stake unless some- 
thing can be done to establish a decent working order among 
the nations of the world. ^ 

About the beginning of 1915 Admiral Tirpitz was reported 
to have made a statement about the use of submarines for 
destroying merchantmen, and about the beginning of 
February an effort was made to establish a war zone about 
the British Isles. At almost exactly the same time England 
put food for Germany on the contraband list, her technical 
excuse being that Germany had taken government charge 
of all food in the Empire and thus could use all of her food 
as a basis of war. The diplomatic controversy that arose 
over the questions of contraband and blockade and war zones 
can not be entered upon here in any detail. It is apparent 
to my mind that Germany can not excuse her attacks upon 
merchant vessels on the ground that she was merely retaliat- 
ing against the British policy of starvation, though it is not 
unlikely that Britain would have attempted to use her fleet 
for that purpose even if Germany had not brought her sub- 
mersibles into play — just as Germany starved Paris in 1870. 
And especially is retaliation not tolerable when it is exercised 
without any reference to the rights and lives of neutrals. 
If Great Britain broke the rules of international law or 
violently extended them for her purposes, there is a very 
marked "difference between a prize court and a torpedo." 
Moreover, the British dispatches to this Government attempt- 
ing to justify her procedure are certainly able and rest in no 
small degree on our own acts during the Civil War. 

Britain guarded and guided our trade even with neutral 
countries through which goods could be sent to Germany; 
but Ave could hardly be asked to do. more than register com- 
plaint in the hope of reserving grounds for reparation or 

^ Those that are still troublea about our entrance into the war should remem- 
ber what was said by our commissioners who had been carrying on relief work 
in Belgium 'We wish to tell you,' they said to President Wilson, "that there is 
no ■n'ord in your historic statement that does not find a response in all our 
hearts. * * * Although we break with great regret our association with 
many German individuals, • * • there Is no hope for democracy or liberal- 
ism unless the system which brought the world into this unfathomable misery 
can be stamped out once for all." 



8 THE GREAT WAR. 

main4:aining the technical rules of law. Did we have ground 
for claiming damages? Perhaps; but our trade prospered 
tremendously and increased greatly even with the neutral 
countries adjacent to Germany.^ 

With the sinking of the Lusitania, May, 1915 — a shameful 
and premeditated crime — President Wilson wrote sharply 
to the German Government asserting that we should defend 
our rights upon the high seas. It seemed at that time our 
evident duty to maintain as much as possible of the shattered 
fabric of international law. Although some persons thought 
we ought to enter the w^ar at once, the President was not at 
that time prepared to advise such action. He still clung to 
the belief or the hope that by reiterated declaration of the 
fundamental principles of justice and humanity Germany 
might be brought to a reasonable course of conduct and that 
some of the principles wrought out by past centuries might 
be preserved. What is the value of international law if it 
is to be cast to the winds when observance is inconvenient? 
After the Sussex affair, in the summer of 1916, our relations 
with the German Government were again greatly strained, 
but President Wilson succeeded in getting a promise that 
m^erchantmen should not be sunk without warning and with- 
out saving lives unless the vessel should resist or attempt to 
escape. This promise was coupled with a condition that 
we should compel Great Britain to surrender what Berlin 
asserted to be an illegal blockade. Remembering, possibly, 
the net into which Napoleon enticed James Madison about 
107 years ago, our Government did not accept the condition, 
but warned German}^ that her obligations were "individual 
not joint, absolute and not relative." We rested easier; but 
we now realized that this willingness to forego the sinking of 
peaceful vessels and the taking of lives can be accounted for 
by the fact that the old U boats were being destroyed and 
the Teutonic powers did not then have in readiness the large 
and improved monsters of the deep with which to carry on 



'While, in my judgment, Britain, in some respects broke away from. the re- 
straints of international law or unduly extended precedents that appeared to 
justify her, the question is by no means an easy one, and I have heard an able 
international lawyer say that, if the subject were submitted to an impartial 
tribunal, he would be by no means certain of a decision in our behalf. 



THE GREAT WAR. 9 

the work of destruction. Conditions were bad enough 
during the latter half of 1916, but with the beginning of 
the new year ruthless warfare was openly and brazenly 
instituted. With the announcement that no warning would 
be given when ships were sunk within a war zone (1917) 
cutting off nearly the whole coast of western Europe, 
President Wilson sent the German ambassador home and 
war seemed inevitable. One of the astounding revelations 
of the political methods of the German foreign office was the 
announcement, made by the chancellor to the Reichstag 
and the German people, that President AVilson had broken 
off diplomatic relations abruptly, although the step was 
taken 18 months or more after the exchange of dispatches on 
the Lnsitania crime and half a year after the exchange of notes 
about the Sussex. 

So far we have given only a meager outline of the story 
and told it ineffectively, for not even in many words can one 
sketch the growing uneasiness and distrust, the sense of 
despair, or the conflict between despair and hope. Was the 
world falling? Was civilization being wrecked in the whirl- 
wind of barbaric passion? Had Germany already destroyed 
civilization by bringing the world to see that there could be 
no faith between nations, and that at any juncture, on the 
spurious plea of necessity, frightful wrong could be com- 
mitted? If this war ended in German victory, a victory 
won by years of devoted preparation, a victory won by 
submarines and Zeppelins and poisonous gases and deporta- 
tion of men, women, and children to work in the fields and 
factories of the conquering country, what was before the 
world? German victory appeared to mean the success of 
ruthlessness, of conquest by military preparation ; it meant 
the enthronement of might ; and it meant that we must 
henceforward live in a world of struggle — we and our children 
after us. 

Why did President Wilson, after long effort to maintain 
neutrality and even hasten the coming of peace, finally 
advocate war? Before attempting to answer this question 
let us recall the President's efforts to bring the conflicting 
nations to a statement of their terms, and to hold out to the 
world the conception of the establishment of permanent 



10 THE GREAT WAR. 

peace. The President's message on this subject came out 
ahnost simultaneously with Germany's proposal in which 
she suggested peace on the basis of an assumed victory for 
her army. Such a peace the allied nations could not accept 
without accepting militarism, without losing the all important 
objects for which millions of men had already given their 
lives; and probably most of us here in America believe that 
such proposals were put forth chiefly to make the G-erman 
people believe that the allies were the aggressors and must 
bear the odium of further conflict. When the President called 
on the warring nations to state their terms of peace, possibly 
he still cherished the hope that, if terms were frankly stated, 
negotiations might actually be begun; almost certainly he 
desired such open statement as would show to the world at 
large the real essence of the conflict and also show that we 
were not ready to enter the struggle until we had made 
every possible effort to bring peace. The President's appeal 
produced no very tangible results, although the allied powers 
stated their desires and purposes with considerable definiteness, 
and these terms did not on the whole appear to us unreasonable 
or unworthy. 

All through this time the President and all thinking Ameri- 
cans were interested chiefly in the maintenance of civiliza- 
tion, and they looked forward not merely to victory or to 
acquisition of territory by one or another nation, but to the 
foundation of a lasting peace by the establishment of prin- 
ciples of justice and reason. We found that Vv^e could not 
paint in too dark colors the future of the world if we are all to 
remain under the pall of fear and suspicion and under the 
overwhelming burden of armament; and thus we came to see 
that without America's entrance into this war there was little 
hope for relief from the crushing weight of war and the almost 
equally burdensome weight of ever-increasing armed prep- 
aration. Never, it appeared, in the long history of mankind 
was there such a fearful alternative ; never a louder call for 
duty. America, without hope of profit, with no mean or hid- 
den, purpose, must herself fight to maintain the principles of 
civilization and for the hope of lasting peace and propriety 
between nations. This growing belief that we must fight for 
peace only gradually conquered most of us; for we had long 



THE GRExVT WAR. 11 

believed that American influence for peace was to come from 
remaining peaceful ; and for this principle, we may still 
maintain, there is much to be said. The creative forces of 
the world, we may still remind ourselves, have sprung from 
character. America, by her successes, in popular govern- 
ment, by a reasonable amount of respect for herself, has 
helped to build up the democratic spirit and the democratic 
power from Peking to Petrograd and from London to Quebec 
and Melbourne. 

This, I say, we believed. But several things showed us that 
this just idealism is for the present impracticable. (1) 
G-erman philosophy scouts and flouts the notion that a state 
must not use its power to dash down opposition. (2) Ger- 
man success would mean the victory of Machtpolitik — a 
victory for the very forces which pacific idealism decries. 
(3) If we expected to bring into the world an appreciation of 
rights and duties, if we hoped for influence in the adjustment 
of world affairs, if we wished to see a world we could live in, 
it was necessary in time of trouble to do our part. The 
President had striven not only for our rights, but for the 
maintenance of law. Under much harsh criticism at home 
he went to the very limits of proposals; he offered his assist- 
ance; he announced that there was such a thing as being 
"too proud to fight;" he spoke of "peace without victory;" 
he hoped that the war could be settled in such a way that the 
nations after the war could live without hatred; he insisted 
that the world must be based on an organization, not for war, 
but for peace and good neighborhood. But strive or struggle 
as he might, it became daily more apparent that we should 
have little or nothing to say after the war, if we, unwilling to 
act now, called upon the nations to enter into a league of 
peace or summoned them to the establishment of a new 
world order. If we held back, contenting ourselves with verbal 
threats and coaxings, we should not have a single friend in 
the wide world unsuspicious of our motives. 

Thus far I have said little about the actual attacks on 
American rights and property. It is not necessary to say 
much, though they reached into the intolerable. Nor do I 
wish to dwell on affronts to American honor, for I do not 
highly value the code of the duelist. We can well remem- 



12 THE GREAT WxVR. 

ber, even in international affairs, that no one but one's self 
can stain one's honor, and that no nation can smirch another 
nation's spirit. We were, as I have said, confronted by a 
world situation in which we must play a strong, manly, and 
honorable part. We despaired of a world in which millions 
of people could be thro"v^Ti into war; millions of young men 
could be buried in trenches on the battle field or left to rot 
under the festering sun of France or Poland; millions of 
children could be beggared or stricken by disease, because 
an emperor and secret government had willed it so, or be- 
cause nations could not learn the simple lessons of decent 
intercourse. What untold anguish might have been saved 
had the impetuous, sword-proud William consented to dis- 
cussion, as Britain pleadingly asked him to do during the last 
days of July, 1914. 

In his war message, April 2, President AVilson announced 
that the American people felt no hostility to the German 
people, but that we could deal no longer with an ambitious, 
autocratic Government which cast a nation into war with 
no apparent hesitation and without discussing their washes. 
We are told, even in these days, that there is no distinction 
between the people and the Government of Germany, and 
that to assert such dualism is to disregard the most evident 
fact. Certainly the great masses of ' the people have sacri- 
ficed their lives for the Fatherland, and yet one of the most 
whimsical products of this war is that some men here in 
America should be asserting the unqualified serenity of the 
political atmosphere of Berlin just when William announced 
that this war had taught him the faithfulness and reliability 
of the common people and that political changes must come, 
and when Hollweg told the junkers that their day of domi- 
nation is nearing its end. William has been taught some- 
thing by the war. Did he have to see a million Germans 
slaughtered, did he have to hear the cries of the widows and 
the fatherless, did he have to see blinded men learning their 
letters and crippled boys creeping along the streets of Berlin, 
before he could learn that the people could be trusted? 
Every recent incident in Germany has demonstrated the 
weakness, not to say the criminality, of the imperial political 
regime. 



THE GREAT WAR. 13 

' ' Still, ' ' some person will say, ' ' Germany is not what Russia 
was. To class Russia, with its cruel, cheap, mercenary 
bureaucracy and Germany together as autocracies is to do 
violence to patent facts." I shall not seek to show how 
nearly the governmental system of the Empire approaches 
in reality the autocratic type and how largely the responsi- 
bility for all imperial acts rests in the hands of the Prussian 
King and a body of irreconcilable aristocrats. Of this much 
could be said, but we can omit all discussion of the quasi- 
representative institutions of the Empire. The trouble is 
deeper than mere forms of Government; for the circle that 
shaped the policy of the State lived — this at least must be 
said — within a wall of psychological superiority and incul- 
cated obedience as the great end of being. Every effort Avas 
made even to convince the German people of their exclusive 
and seclusive superiority, and William himself, a "king by 
the grace of God," was not able to see what a tragic, pathetic, 
and humorous figure he made in the modern world of modern 
men. The whole psychological situation produced a disloca- 
tion of realities and a distortion of living truths. 

The present war makes us comrades in arms of the two 
great popular Governments of western Europe, Great Britain 
and France. We have, I think, no real or fancied interest in 
mere territorial readjustment which would add to the power 
of either of these nations, but we are justified in having con- 
fidence in the democracy of France and the liberal forces of 
Great Britain. Our sympathy for France ought to teach us 
a great lesson. It shows us that republics are not ungrateful 
and that, after the lapse of 140 years, despite quarrels and 
disputes vath the French Government, we are still bound 
down by sentimental ties of gratitude to France. We have 
come to see the undying streng-th of friendship between the 
masses of men and are given new hope that democracies, if 
they are willing to think, can not make war upon one another 
impetuously and in hatred. For England we still cherish, 
unfortunately, some of the old grievances that have been 
carried doT\TL, decade by decade, and taught through our 
school books to each succeeding generation. We have not 
been properly taught to see that our own Revolution was an 
English revolution, in which Englishmen of this side of the 



14 THE GREAT WAR, 

ocean were striving for the development and maintenance of 
liberty, and that that war, too, was a war against an arrogant 
leaden-headed aristocracy. ]\Iisunderstanding of Britain 
comes from the failure to appreciate the development of 
liberalism in her Government, until she stands forth to-day 
as a great representative of democracy and of belief in the 
power and will of the common people. 

To lose sight of England's transformation, in which we 
have had a great part, is to lose sight of one of the most 
momentous developments of the last hundred years. Can 
we not forget crazy old George III and Lord North and the 
rest of his tribe, and remember the men of the middle cen- 
tury, the creators of modern British liberalism — Cobden, 
Bright, and Gladstone, and a myriad of bold commoners — 
who battled successfully to destroy ''the fortress of feudal- 
ism"? Can we not learn how deeply we are involved in 
the mighty structure of the British Empire as we find the 
lessons of our owti Revolution and of our later history 
wrought into the policy of world-wide dominion? Can we 
not see that the greatest empire of all history has been built 
on the lessons of liberty which Britain learned from George 
Washington and Abraham Lincoln? Can we not see the 
tremendous force of democracy and individual liberty when 
we Imow that thousands upon thousands of colonials gave 
their lives ungrudgingly at Galipoli and Ypres? Surely we 
must come to see that a democracy like France or a demo- 
cratic empire like Great Britain runs our own risks, faces our 
own dangers, is subject to the faults and blunders which we 
know so well, and that we are not misled if the result of our 
efforts is to uphold a structure of imperial order based on the 
principles of justice, the strength of which has been so dramat- 
ically shown in the past three years. Sometimes one is 
asked ironically when, forsooth, England became the friend 
of America. The answer can be quickly given, and given 
with absolute historical accuracy. It was when the Brit- 
ish Parliament in 1867 passed the second reform bill and 
England became a democracy — about two years and a half 
after the English aristocrats had fully seen their mistakes 
during our Civil War and had come to see that the greatest 



THE GREAT WAR. 15 

statesman the nineteenth century had as yet produced was 
not born in a manor house on an English countryside, but in 
a log cabin in Kentuckj^ Likewise it can probably be safely 
said that France became our real friend, a nation with which 
we could work with open friendliness, when, with the down- 
fall of Napoleon III, the republican institutions of France 
were finally and firmly established. 

In the conduct of this Avar we must constantly remember 
that we have had hopes of rendering the world safe for democ- 
racy. With all our frailties, which we must openly con- 
fess, with all our wastefulness and with all our follies, this 
war has taught us, as nothing else could, that there is noth- 
ing upon which we can more safely rely than the plain sense 
of the plain people. Perhaps nothing shows this more con- 
clusively than our reluctance and distaste for military con- 
quest and our hesitation in making up our minds to fight. 
We may continually remember the words of Lord John 
Russell — and no one better than he had reason to know the 
truth: "All experience of human nature teaches us the fact, 
that men who possess a superiority, real or imaginary, over 
their fellow creatures will abuse the advantages they en- 
joy." We must remember that we entered the war for 
peace, and we are offering a great sacrifice for a new world 
order. We believed that we could not get it by chiding 
Europe and refusing to do our part now, for Europe needed 
the assistance of an external power, disinterested and high- 
hearted. We may remember that we have covered a conti- 
nent almost as large as the whole of Europe with self- 
governing Commonwealths. We may remember the unselfish 
side of the ]\Ionroe doctrine which we try to live up to 
as embodying a belief that nations may live their own lives; 
and we can call attention to Mexico, Avhich we have allowed 
to wallow in revolutions and destroy American lives and 
property because Ave belieA'e that only by trial can nations 
rise and that every nation is entitled to its oaati undisturbed 
revolution if there is hope for the struggling masses. And 
withal we must strive to saA^e our oaati real selves, our OAvn 
essential character; for AA^hat Avould it profit us if Ave fought 
the whole world and lost ourselves? We noAV knoAV, if never 



LS,^"^ °^ CONGRESS 



16 THE GREAT WAR. 




020 913 091 9 • 



before, that war is horrible and demoniacally ridiculous; 
that peaceful relations between nations have been endangered 
by intrigue, greed, false pride, covetousness, and suspicion ; 
•^hat big armies do not make for peace, but beget arro- 
gance ; that human misconduct and discourtesy may make 
enemies, and that nothing is more vitiating than unmanly 
envy or fear of a prosperous neighbor; that democracy 
must be the basis of a sound political system, but it must 
be real, conscientious, intelligent, and open-minded, or we 
may plunge into cataclysmic anarchy. We may all take cour- 
age in remembering that the President of the United States 
has led us reluctantly and with unwilling feet into a war 
which we believe will help to establish democracy, humanity, 
and a sense of national duty without profit. 



yjRARY OF CONGRESS 

020 913 091 9 



